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Comments
THE MARYLAND INMATE GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
OR THE FEDERAL COURTS? A PROBLEM
OF EXHAUSTION
Throughout the past decade federal courts have borne the burden of
an enormous increase in the number of civil rights actions filed by state
prisoners against their jailors challenging the conditions of their confinement.' In part due to the ready access to federal courts that is available
to state prisoners 2 under the Civil Rights Act of 18718 and in part due to
a recognition by federal judges that state prisoners enjoy a growing number of constitutional rights, 4 this increase has had a deleterious effect on
1. 1974 DIR. ADM. OFF. U.S. CTs., ANN. RE. 220-21. This report reveals that
in fiscal 1966, 218 civil rights petitions were filed by state prisoners in United States
District Courts. By 1974 the number had grown to 5,236, an increase of over two
thousand percent. The increase from 1973 to 1974 was over twenty-five percent.
2. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), discussed in the text accompanying
notes 65-81 infra; Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v.
Pape, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1486 (1969).

3. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)
(1970), & 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
4. See, e.g., Smith v. Bounds, Civil No. 74-2378 (4th Cir., Sept. 30, 1975)
(state prisoners entitled to adequate legal library facilities for use in preparing
pro se habeas corpus or civil rights actions, or an acceptable alternative) ; Holt v.
Sarver, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971) (prisoners must be protected from assaults
by other inmates and prison trustees and must be provided with adequate barracks) ;
Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) (prisoners have an eighth amendment
right to be free from corporal punishment, including whipping, as a means of discipline) ; Wright v. McMann, 387 F2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967) (prisoners are protected by
eighth amendment from punishment in form of confinement in strip cells, in which
inmates are placed without clothes or sanitary facilities and are exposed to cold, filth,
and unusual punishment) ; Hirons v. Director, 351 F.2d 613 (4th Cir. 1965) (prisoner
must be provided adequate medical and surgical treatment when necessary); Pierce
v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961) (prisoners must be allowed access to
religious writings and may not be persecuted because of their beliefs); Bundy v.
Cannon, 328 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1971) (prisoners must receive adequate notice of
charges in a substantial disciplinary proceeding and must be guaranteed a relatively
objective and impartial tribunal).
The federal courts' initial response to the civil rights complaints of prisoners
concerning the administration of state prisons was to refuse to become involved in an
area that was considered to be the sole prerogative of state officials. For example,
in Siegel v. Ragen, 88 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Ill. 1949), state prisoners complained
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the operation of the courts. For example, the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland has been inundated by "a mound of prisoner
petitions the volume of which never seems to decrease, no matter how
rapidly the pending cases are adjudicated."5 Given this burden and the
state's desire to be free from federal interference, it was inevitable that
efforts would be taken to alter the procedures by which prisoners' grievances might be resolved. 6
The Maryland General Assembly took a significant step in this alteration in 1971 by enacting section 204F of article 41 of the Maryland Code
which creates the Maryland Inmate Grievance Commission. 7 Established
as a separate agency within the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, 8 the Commission is empowered to work within the organization of the correctional system to remedy affronts to those rights which
prisoners are entitled to enjoy. 9 It was hoped by the legislature that the
Commission would reduce the volume of prisoner petitions to the federal
district court by providing a simpler, more efficient administrative forum
for resolving inmate grievances. 10 The statute, as interpreted by the Maryabout prison conditions including beatings by guards. The court considered the
allegations concerning the beatings to state a legitimate cause of action under section
1983, but refused to consider the other allegations concerning prison conditions
in general. It stated that it was "not prepared to establish itself as a 'co-administrator'
of State prisons along with the duly appointed State officials." Id. at 999. Other
cases following this approach are compiled in Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts:
A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J.

506, 508 n.12 (1963).
Another example of how inmates have been encouraged to litigate appears

from Johnson v.Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969). There the Court held that states could
not prohibit inmates from aiding other inmates inthe preparation of legal documents
unless the states themselves provided reasonable legal services. See also Larsen,
A Prisoner Looks at Writ-Writing, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 343 (1968); Rothman, Decarcerating Prisoners and Patients, 1 Crv. LI. REV. 8, 12-14 (1973) ; Millemann,
Prison Disciplinary Hearings & Procedural Due Process - The Requirement of a
Full Administrative Hearing,31 MD.L. REV. 27 (1971).

5. McCray v.Burrell, 367 F. Supp. 1191, 1193 (D. Md. 1973). In fiscal 1973,
118 civil rights prisoner petitions were filed in the District Court for the District of
Maryland, a number constituting more than ten percent of all civil filings. 1973 DIR.
AD. OFF. U.S. CTS., ANN. REP. 331.

6. For a description and analysis of the various developments in the area of
procedures for resolution of prisoner grievances see CENTER FOR CORRECTIONAL JUSTICE,
TOWARD A GREATER MEASURE OF JUSTICE: GRIEVANCE MECHANISMS IN CORRECTIONAL

INSTITUTIONS (1975).
7. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 204F (Supp. 1975).
8. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 204F(a) (Supp.

1975). The Commission is also
independent of the Division of Corrections, the agency immediately responsible for
the daily operation of the prisons which is also within the Department. MD. ANN.
CODE art. 41, § 204D (1971).
9. For a summary of these rights see note 4 supra.
10. The Attorney General suggested that two reasons for creating the Commission
were the overcrowded federal court dockets and Mr. Chief Justice Burger's admonishment to the states that inmate grievance procedures were needed to lessen this
federal caseload. 59 MD. ATT'Y GEN. REP. & Op. 438-39 (1974).
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land Court of Appeals, requires exhaustion of this remedy before a prisoner
may file suit in a state court." Under prevailing federal law, however,
prisoners were not required to exhaust state administrative remedies before filing civil rights complaints in the district courts. 12 A conflict thus
arose between the efforts of the Maryland General Assembly and the
federal doctrine of non-exhaustion.
In 1972 the Fourth Circuit took note of the nascent Commission,
suggesting that when the Commission should become fully operational,
the doctrine of non-exhaustion would be reexamined. 13 In October 1973
the United States District Court for the District of Maryland undertook
this reexamination. It announced in McCray v. Burrell :14
[t]he time has come to take a careful and critical look at the continued
validity of the sweeping interpretation which caused § 1983 to be read
as a mandate to federal courts and forces them to accept all but the
most patently ridiculous complaints from state prisoners, no matter
how hard or how successfully the state has tried to set its own prison
house in order. 15
This Comment will examine the Maryland Inmate Grievance Commission and the McCray litigation presently before the Supreme Court, focusing on whether state prisoners should be required to exhaust adequate state
administrative remedies before bringing civil rights actions in the federal
courts. 16 While an exhaustion requirement appears desirable in theory,
the concept of "adequacy" must be defined before such a requirement can
be implemented. A proposed test for adequacy is therefore formulated,
the Maryland Inmate Grievance Commission is analyzed under it, and
recommendations for improvements are made.
THE COMMISSION

In 1971 Maryland became the first state to provide a quasi-judicial
proceeding for hearing inmate grievances. 17 The Maryland General Assembly, encouraged by Chief Justice Burger,1 8 the Governor's Office, and the
11. State v. McCray, 267 Md. 111, 146, 297 A.2d 265, 283-84 (1972). See MD.
ANN. CODE art. 41, § 204F(l) (Supp. 1975), which provides: "No court shall be
required to entertain an inmate's grievance or complaint within the jurisdiction of
the Inmate Grievance Commission unless and until the complainant has exhausted
the remedies as provided in this section...."
12. See text accompanying notes 65-81 infra.
13. Hayes v. Secretary, 455 F.2d 798 (4th Cir. 1972).
14. 367 F. Supp. 1191, 1194 (D. Md. 1973), rev'd, 516 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1975)
(en banc), cert. granted, 96 S.Ct. 264 (1975).
15. Id. at 1194.
16. The issue of cruel and unusual punishment with which the McCray court
dealt is not discussed herein.
17. Tibbles, Ombudsmen for American Prisons, 48 N.D.L. Rzv. 383, 418 (1972).
18. Address by Chief Justice Burger to the National Association of Attorneys
General, in Washington, D.C., Feb. 6, 1970, quoted in State v. McCray, 267 Md.
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Attorney General of Maryland, 19 established an Inmate Grievance Commission designed to hear and resolve grievances of persons confined in
state correctional institutions within the Division of Correction without the
necessity of resorting to formal litigation. The Commission consists of
five members appointed by the Governor with the advice of the Secretary
of the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services. 20 Two or
more members of the Commission must have knowledge and experience in
one or more fields under the jurisdiction of the Department; in addition,
two or more Commission members must be attorneys.2 1 Each member of
the Commission serves a four-year term on a part-time basis and is compensated at a per diem rate. 22 The Commission is administered by an
Executive Director, a salaried employee, who is appointed for a four-year
term by the Secretary with the advice of the Commission and the approval
of the Governor.23 He is provided with secretarial, investigative, and
24
clerical help by the Secretary.
Any person who is confined to an institution within the Division of
Correction, is otherwise in the custody of the Commissioner of Correction, or is confined to Patuxent Institution, may file a grievance with the
Commission 25 against officials or employees of the Division of Correction or
of Patuxent. 26 If the instituiton itself has a fair and reasonable procedure
111, 297 A.2d 265 (1972). See generally Burger, "No Man is an Island," 56 A.B.A.J.
325 (1970).
19. 59 MD. ATT'y GEN. REP. & Op. 438 (1974).
20. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 204F(a) (Supp. 1975). The current membership
of the Commission includes one practicing attorney, a retired Director of the Federal
Bureau of Prisons (also an attorney), a retired insurance executive who is also an
industrial relations consultant to the Bureau of Prisons, a former probation officer
and guard at the Patuxent Institution, and the retired director of the state's Division
of Parole and Probation. 367 F. Supp. at 1202.
21. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 204F(a) (Supp. 1975).
22. Id.
23. Id. at § 204F(b).
24. Id.
25. Id. at § 204F(d). This group does not include those confined in local jails
or those on parole or probation because the local jails and the Division of Parole
and Probation are not organized under the Division of Correction in Maryland.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 25A, § 5(C) (Supp. 1975) ; id. at art. 41, § 204D(b) (1971).
26. Id. at art. 41, § 204F(d) (Supp. 1975). The Attorney General has interpreted
this broad authorization to include grievances in the following categories:
(1) Complaints in which the inmate alleges a deprivation of his constitutional
rights. Examples of these actions are, but not limited to, objections to decisions
of the adjustment (disciplinary) teams (due process violations), conditions of
confinement, double jeopardy, mail censorship.
(2) Complaints in which the inmate alleges a misdeed by officials of the
Division of Correction or Patuxent Institution which does not amount to a
deprivation of his constitutional rights but is protected by federal or state laws.
Examples of these would be alleged torts by correctional officers, the failure of the
institution to deliver packages, the failure to credit time spent in other institutions,
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that is appropriate for resolution of the inmate's particular grievance, the
Commission may require that such procedure be exhausted prior to submission of the grievance. 27 It is the policy of the Commission to refrain
from hearing any matter currently under the jurisdiction of a court of
29
law.28 Grievances are presented to the Commission in letter form. Upon
receipt of the grievance, a preliminary review of the complaint is made.80
The complaint may be dismissed by a Commissioner or, as is usually the
the failure of the classification teams to approve transfers to other institutions,
lost or stolen property, and other administrative actions.
(3) Complaints in which the inmate alleges an act of correctional officials
or employees which do not amount to a deprivation of constitutional or legal
rights but which might require administrative relief or corrective action. An
example of this would be the denial by the warden to recognize a prisoner
organization within the institution.
59 MD. ATT'Y GEN. REP. & Op. at 442-43. The types of grievances received are
indicated in the following chart prepared by Mr. Robert H. Wolfe, Legal Assistant
to the Commission. It includes all grievances received during the year ending May
31, 1975:
Percent
Number
Type of Complaint Received
36
299
Adjustment Team Appeals
24
197
Classification Actions
13
112
Property
6
47
Medical
5
40
Clerical Error
4
32
Non-Physical Abuse
2
22
Living Conditions
2
21
Judicial
1
13
Parole
1
9
Commissary
1
7
Visitors
1
6
General Inquiries
1
13
Physical Abuse
1
5
Mail
.5
4
Legal Assistance
.5
4
Religious
.5
3
Reading Materials
.5
3
Non-penal Institutionalization
TOTALS
837
100
27. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 204F(d) (Supp. 1975). For example, the Commission has required that where complaints arise out of a disciplinary action within
the institution, the inmate must first follow all institutional adjustment procedures
prior to submission of the grievance. 12 Md. Agency Rules & Reg., Inmate Grievance
Comm'n, R. 12.07.00.01 (1971).
28. Interview with Mr. Robert H. Wolfe, Legal Assistant to the Maryland
Inmate Grievance Commission, in Baltimore, Sept. 26, 1975.
29. 12 Md. Agency Rules & Reg., Inmate Grievance Comm'n, R. 12.07.00.02
(1971).
30. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 204F(e) (Supp. 1975). It is at this point that
the grievance may be informally resolved. Over half of the complaints received by
the Commission have been disposed of administratively during the initial review.
MD. INMATE GRIEVANCE COMM'N, STATISTICAL SUMMARY (Aug. 1975).
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case, the Director, without affording the inmate a hearing if, on its face,
the complaint is found to be totally lacking in merit.3 1 If the complaint
is dismissed at this point, the inmate must be notified within sixty days
following the submission date of the grievance and this is considered the
final decision of the Secretary for purposes of judicial review.3 2 If the
Director finds obvious merit to the grievance during the initial investigation, he is often able to remedy the situation immediately merely by calling
33
official attention to the problem.
Should the initial investigation of the facts not result in an adminis34
trative disposition, the inmate is afforded a hearing on the matter
3
5
which takes place at the institution where the inmate is confined.
The
inmate, at his own expense, may be represented by an attorney3 6 or by a
fellow inmate.37 He may also call a reasonable number of witnesses and
may question any witness who testifies.38 Prior to the hearing, the Commission may subpoena witnesses and documents3 9 and it may require that
testimony be given under oath. 40 The Commission must keep a record of
the complaints and their dispositions. 41 By use of a portable tape recorder,
the testimony before the Commission is preserved. At least three members of the Commission must be present at the hearing and a decision must
be by a majority of those sitting.42
On the basis of the hearing, the Commission may find the complaint
lacking in merit and issue an order dismissing it or it may find the complaint meritorious in whole or in part. In the latter instance, the Commission must then forward its order to the Secretary. Within fifteen days,
the Secretary must affirm, reverse, or modify the order. 43 The Maryland
Attorney General has advised that the scope of the Secretary's review is
similar to that of a court of appeals with respect to the decision of a trial
court.44 It should be noted that it is only the order of the Secretary which
will actually be enforced by the prisons; an order of the Commission is

31. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 204F(e) (Supp. 1975).

32. Id.
33. Interview with Mr. Dene Lusby, Executive Director of the Maryland Inmate
Grievance Commission, in Cockeysville, Sept. 26, 1975. According to Mr. Lusby,
roughly thirty-five to forty percent of all administrative dispositions favor the inmate.
34. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 204F(f) (Supp. 1975).
35. Id. at § 204F(j).
36. Id. at § 204F(h).
37. Interview with Mr. Robert H. Wolfe, Legal Assistant to the Maryland
Inmate Grievance Commission, in Baltimore, Sept. 26, 1975. See also Johnson v.
Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
38. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 204F(f) (Supp. 1975).
39. Id. at § 204F(g).
40. Id.
41. Id. at § 204F(i).
42. Id. at § 204F(f).
43. Id.
44. See note 155 infra.
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final only if it dismisses a complaint. If the inmate is dissatisfied with the
disposition, he is entitled to judicial review in the appropriate state court.4 5
The statute limits the scope of judicial review to a review of the Commission's record and the Secretary's order to determine if there occurred
any violation of constitutional requirements or of any right protected by
federal or state laws.46 As interpreted by the Maryland Court of Appeals,
this statutory scheme was intended by the legislature to be the exclusive
method by which the state would resolve inmate grievances; 47 therefore,
inmates may not seek direct judicial relief from state courts.
Recent statistics indicate that the Commission received approximately
2700 complaints in its first four years, of which more than half were disposed of administratively. 48 Of the 1065 orders issued as of August 1975,
three hundred found the inmate grievance meritorious. 49
Predictably, reaction to the Commission has been mixed. One early
evaluation suggested that the Commission's history to that point was
marked by unsteady and dubious achievement ;50 however, a more recent
ANN. CODE art. 41, § 204F(1) (Supp. 1975).
46. Id. The scope of review under the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act,
which is applicable to all state agencies unless expressly excluded, is much broader.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 244 (Supp. 1975), § 255 (1971). The Administrative Pro-

45. MD.

cedure Act provides in part:
[A] court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further
proceedings; or it may reverse or modify the decision if the substantial rights of
the petitioners may have been prejudiced because the administrative findings,
inferences, or conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) In violation of constitutional provisions; or
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of jurisdiction of the agency; or
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure; or
(4) Affected by other error of law; or
(5) Unsupported by competent, material and substantial evidence in view of
the entire record as submitted; or
(6) Against the weight of competent, material and substantial evidence in
view of the entire record, as submitted by the agency and including de
novo evidence taken in open court; or
(7) Unsupported by the entire record, as submitted by the agency and including de novo evidence taken in open court; or
(8) Arbitrary or capricious.
Id. at § 255(g). See generally Tomlinson, Constitutional Limits on the Decisional
Povers of Courts and Administrative Agencies in Maryland, 35 MD. L. REv. 414 (1975).

47. McCray v. State, 267 Md. 111, 297 A.2d 265 (1972).
48. MD. INMATE GRIEVANCE COMM'N, STATISTICAL SUMMARY (Aug. 1975).
49. Id.

50. In Keating & Singer, Prisoner Grievance Mechanisms, 19 CRIME & DELiNQUENCY 367, 375 (1973), the authors state:
The vast majority of the cases handled by the Commission in its first eighteen
months of existence have concerned appeals from the decisions of various prison
disciplinary boards. The Commission has not addressed itself to pervasive, systemic problems. In June 1972, its first executive director resigned in frustration
over what he considered the unwillingness of Maryland correctional officials to
enforce and implement the Commission's "orders."

During a series of summer

riots in Maryland institutions in 1972, there was no mention of the grievance
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report by another outside source indicated that the Commission had in fact
accomplished several significant objectives, including acceptance by both
prisoners and jailers, resolution of numerous complaints, and an exposure
of unsatisfactory conditions and practices to official scrutiny.5 1
EXHAUSTION OF ADEQUATE STATE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
BY STATE PRISONERS AS PREREQUISITE TO FEDERAL
JUDICIAL RELIEF UNDER SECTION

1983

52
McCray v. Burrell

In McCray an inmate at the Maryland Penitentiary filed two pro se
complaints invoking the jurisdiction of the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)' 3 and seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 198354 for deprivations of liberty without due
commission by either inmates or administration; even a charge of inadequacy
might have indicated that both sides at least recognized the Commission's potential for resolving institutional problems.
51. In RESOURCE CENTER ON CORRECTIONAL LAW AND LEGAL SERVICES, ABA
COMM'N

ON

CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES

&

SERVICES,

MARYLAND
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7, 11 (Ombudsman/Grievance Mechanism Profiles - No. 3) (1974) (footnote omitted), it is stated:
The Commission seems to have gained acceptance by correctional administrators throughout the state. It has recognized and reinforced areas of proper
correctional practice and has identified numerous problem areas in the operation
of the state's correctional system, assisting in their resolution. It has also become
a "safety valve," in the eyes of some correctional personnel, for relieving tensions within institutions.
The Inmate Grievance Commission was originally viewed by some as the
means through which major change could be stimulated within Maryland's Correctional system. While this goal does not yet appear to have been achieved, the
Commission has (i) validated inmate grievances in a significant number of
cases, (ii) had its recommendations accepted by correctional authorities in the
great majority of cases, (iii) expressed public and official concern for the care
and treatment of those incarcerated and (iv) emphasized the need for correctional
services to be administered fairly in a humane manner, and in harmony with
statutory and constitutional guarantees.
52. 516 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1975) (en bane), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 264 (1975).
McCray's two original complaints, McCray v. Burrell, and McCray v. Smith, were
later consolidated by the district court and heard jointly. 367 F. Supp. 1191, 1193
(D. Md. 1973). In both cases the defendants were prison officials.
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970) provides in pertinent part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
COMM'N

(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity
secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States. ...
54. The text of this statute is set out in note 3 supra.
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process of law and for imposition of cruel and unusual punishment.
McCray complained that on two separate occasions he had been placed
naked in an isolation cell for "mental observation."5 5 On both occasions,
he was confined for forty-eight hours under primitive conditions without
being seen by any individual capable of performing the purported "mental
observation."5' 6 For these alleged constitutional violations, he sought injunctive relief and damages. 57 The district court dismissed his complaints
with prejudice, holding that Maryland state prisoners must exhaust the
adequate state administrative remedy provided by the Commission before
seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts for actions brought
under section 1983.58 Looking to the merits of the claim, the court held
that no constitutional violations had occurred in the incidents alleged, 59
and that, in any event, the defendants had acted in good faith reliance on
standard operating procedures and were therefore immune from liability
in damages. 60 On appeal, however, the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding
that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required in section 1983
cases. 61 On the merits the court held that McCray's constitutional right
not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment had been violated in
both instances of isolated confinement ;62 the case was remanded to the
district court for additional findings on the issue of liability for damages.63
Finally, the court found it unnecessary to rule on the efficacy of the state
administrative remedy, although it did note several of McCray's arguments against the adequacy of the Commission procedures.64
In McCray the Fourth Circuit presented a cogent analysis" of the
important cases dealing with exhaustion of remedies which can be summarized as follows. Exhaustion of state and federal administrative remedies and state judicial remedies is often held to be a prerequisite to federal
55. 516 F.2d at 366.
56. Id. at 365-67.
57. Id. at 360.
58. 367 F. Supp. at 1210.
59. Id. at 1216-17.
60. Id. at 1217.
61. 516 F.2d at 365. McCray's appeal was consolidated with two other cases involving Maryland state prisoners' 1983 actions which had been dismissed for failure
to exhaust the remedy provided by the Commission. Id. at 360. These cases were
remanded to the district court for hearings on the merits. Id. at 365.
62. 516 F.2d at 367-69.
63. The court of appeals remanded the case to the district court because that
court had too hastily concluded that the defendants were immune without requiring
them to sustain their burden of proof on this issue. 516 F.2d at 370. Additionally,
subsequent to the district court's opinion and the preparation of the opinion by the
court of appeals, as noted by Judge Winter in an addendum, id. at 371, the Supreme
Court decided Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975), which further defined
conditions under which immunity from damages would be granted to state officials
in section 1983 suits. Id. at 321-22.
64. See text accompanying notes 65-81 infra.
65. 516 F.2d at 361-65.
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judicial relief. 66 In Monroe v. Pape,67 however, the Supreme Court held
that victims of illegal searches conducted by state police officers were not
required to exhaust state judicial remedies before seeking federal relief
under section 1983. "It is no answer that the State has a law which if
enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the
state remedy, and the latter need not first be sought and refused before the
federal one is invoked." 68 Although earlier cases had held that state
judicial remedies need not be exhausted in cases arising under section
1983,69 the Monroe decision was based on an analysis of the statute and
was made without reference to those cases. The broad language of the
Court, quoted above, did not distinguish between judicial and administrative remedies, nor did it distinguish between adequate and inadequate
remedies. It was therefore not surprising that in McNeese v. Board of
Education,70 where the Supreme Court was presented with the issue
whether to require exhaustion of administrative remedies in a civil rights
action seeking school desegregation, the broad language of Monroe was
held to control and no exhaustion was required. An alternative holding
in McNeese, that exhaustion of the particular administrative remedy was
unnecessary in any event because that remedy was inadequate, was potentially important because the result in McNeese arguably did not foreclose
the possibility that exhaustion would be required when a section 1983
plaintiff's administrative remedy was found to be adequate. Damico v.
California,71 however, settled this point, at least in the area of welfare
litigation. A three-judge district court required exhaustion of what it
found to be an adequate state administrative remedy; the Supreme Court
reversed, citing McNeese and Monroe for the rule that no exhaustion is
required in section 1983 actions. In Houghton v. Shafer72 the Court
applied its non-exhaustion doctrine to a state prisoner's civil rights action.
There the Court reversed a dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies on the dual grounds that the available remedy was inadequate
and that, under McNeese and Monroe, exhaustion was unnecessary in
section 1983 cases. Wilwording v. Swenson 73 strengthened the notion
that the Monroe language is applicable in the context of a state prisoner
66. Id. at 361.
67. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
68. Id. at 183.
69. E.g., Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939). In Lane, the Court reaffirmed
the distinction between administrative and judicial remedies first drawn in Bacon v.
Rutland R.R., 232 U.S. 134 (1914), and held that exhaustion of judicial as opposed
to administrative remedies is not required in cases brought under the Civil Rights Act
of 1871. The justification for this distinction is "the potential res judicata and collateral estoppel effects of state court judgments." Comment, Exhaustion of State Administrative Remedies in Section 1983 Cases, 41 U. Cni. L. IEv. 537, 551 n.68 (1974).
70. 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
71. 389 U.S. 416 (1967) (per curiarn).
72. 392 U.S. 639 (1968) (per curiam).
73. 404 U.S. 249 (1971) (per curiarn).
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civil rights action. In Wilwording the prisoner's petition appeared to be
a request for a writ of habeas corpus; however, the Court treated it as a
civil rights action since it challenged the conditions rather than the fact
or duration of confinement. Exhaustion of remedies is required by statute
in federal habeas corpus actions ;74 but since this was a section 1983 action,
that statutory requirement was inapplicable. The Court held that the available remedy was inadequate. It went further, however, citing Houghton
for the principle that, as far as exhaustion is concerned, state prisoners
are on a par with other civil rights plaintiffs, and therefore exhaustion
75
is unnecessary in any event.

On the basis of these and similar cases,7 6 the Fourth Circuit considered the rule settled that exhaustion is unnecessary in actions brought
under section 1983. It recognized that the district court in McCray,
following another lower court decision, 7 7 had concluded that no case had
ever presented the Supreme Court with a state prisoner's civil rights action
where an adequate administrative remedy had been available. 78 While the
lower court considered this an invitation to analyze the various policies
involved in requiring exhaustion, the Fourth Circuit looked first for some
indication that the Supreme Court would ever limit the application of the
broad Monroe language and treat state prisoners with adequate remedies
differently from other civil rights plaintiffs. A dictum in Gibson v. Berryhill 79 was the closest indication cited to the court by the appellees. The
Supreme Court in Gibson stated that it was an open question whether
exhaustion of a state administrative remedy might be required in a section
74. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1970).
75. Professor Millemann has suggested that the federal courts owe a particular
duty to hear the complaints of state prison inmates. Because prisoners retain certain
liberties upon incarceration, yet are in many respects totally dependent upon the state
for the necessities of life, are generally disenfranchised, and have traditionally been
neglected by state governments and abused by jailors, it is arguable that the need for
access to a federal forum is acute. See Millemann, Protected Inmate Liberties: A
Case for Judicial Responsibility, 53 OitE. L. Riv. 29 (1973).
76. Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669 (1972) (per curiam), held that exhaustion
was not required in welfare cases brought under section 1983. In Metcalf v. Swank,
406 U.S. 914 (1972), vacating judgment and remanding nem., 444 F.2d 1353 (1971),
an affirmance by the court of appeals of a dismissal for failure to exhaust adequate
state administrative remedies was vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light
of Carter. Metcalf was also a welfare case. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974),
in which an individual sought a declaration that a state criminal statute was unconstitutional, treated the law as settled that exhaustion is not required in section 1983
cases. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), was treated as apparently having
given the Court the opportunity to impose an exhaustion requirement in section 1983
cases, which it declined to do.
77. Kochie v. Norton, 343 F. Supp. 956 (D. Conn. 1972).
78. In Morgan v. La Vallee, No. 75-2044 (2d Cir., Oct. 14, 1975), the Second
Circuit also suggests that where there are adequate state administrative remedies
available to state prisoners, exhaustion could be required by a federal court before
hearing a section 1983 claim.
79. 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
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1983 action if the plaintiffs would suffer no deprivation of protected rights
until the completion of the administrative proceeding. The Fourth Circuit
found this to be a question of ripeness and an insufficient basis to justify
"depart [ing] from the apparent scope and the literal language of the other
Supreme Court cases." 80 It therefore declined to analyze the policies surrounding the issue whether to require exhaustion of adequate state administrative remedies by state prisoners as a prerequisite to federal judicial
relief under section 1983.81
Another line of Supreme Court cases, originating with Younger v.
82
Harris,
suggests a different approach to the analysis of whether to require exhaustion. In Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,83 one of the most recent
in the Younger line of cases, a movie theatre was ordered closed as a result
of the decision in a state judicial action brought by a county prosecutor
under a state public nuisance statute. Rather than appeal the state court
judgment, the theatre owner chose to initiate a section 1983 action in
federal court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief on the theory that
the statute was unconstitutional under the first and fourteenth amendments. The principal issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether
the doctrine of Younger v. Harris applied to such a quasi-criminal state
judicial proceeding. Younger held that absent extraordinary circumstances
a federal court must dismiss when a defendant in a state criminal prosecution seeks federal relief under section 1983 to enjoin the state court proceedings on the grounds that the statute under which the prosecution is
brought is unconstitutional.8 4 Despite the fact that Younger involved a
pending state criminal prosecution and that part of the rationale of that
case was the ancient principle that equity will not enjoin a criminal trial,85
the Huffman Court required dismissal in the case of a civil, albeit quasicriminal, state proceeding. 88 In so doing the Court gave even greater
weight to considerations of comity and federalism than it had previously.
Furthermore, the Huffman Court recognized that it was forcing the section 1983 plaintiff to exhaust his state appellate remedies.87 In earlier
cases it was the state-initiated trial which prompted the dismissal. Because
the friction that federal interference would create by declaring unconstitutional a state statute after the section 1983 plaintiff had lost in state court
is less than that which would result from interruption of the trial itself,
Huffman in a second respect represents an unprecedented degree of defer80. 516 F.2d at 364.
81. Id. at 365.
82. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
83. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
84. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975); Hicks v. Miranda, 422
U.S. 332, 349 (1975); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975); Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
85. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45.
86. 420 U.S. at 607-13.
87. 420 U.S. 609-10 n.21.
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ence to state interests. A dissenting opinion in Huffman bemoans the
apparent encroachment this holding works on the non-exhaustion rule
of Monroe and its progeny, 88 and a dissent in McCray reads Huffman to
illustrate that the non-exhaustion rule is no longer all-encompassing.8 9
The Younger-type cases do in fact involve section 1983 actions which
federal courts refuse to hear in deference to state proceedings which raise
the same federal constitutional issues and which the federal plaintiff is
forced to exhaust before reaching a federal forum. These cases can be distinguished as a class from other section 1983 cases in that, in the Youngertype cases, the state has initiated the state proceedings, and the proceedings themselves, either criminal or quasi-criminal, are of high interest to
the state. Federal courts consider interference in such cases to create so
serious and direct a confrontation between the state and national governments as to outweigh at least temporarily the responsibility of the federal
courts to adjudicate issues of federal constitutional law.90 The fact that
the Court in these cases weighs its duty to uphold individual constitutional
rights against its duty to defer to legitimate state interests suggests that
such a balancing should underlie all section 1983 cases. 91 Cases such as
Monroe and McNeese can then be reconciled with this theory as cases in
which the state interests were not high enough to justify federal deference
to them. If this approach is accepted as valid, then the McCray litigation
presents the Supreme Court with a possibly unique set of competing
interests to weigh. Riding on the outcome of the McCray case will be the
88. 420 U.S. at 617-18 (dissenting opinion).
89. 516 F.2d at 376 (dissenting opinion).
90. Although not a case involving criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings traditional in Younger-type cases, Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973), illustrates
this balancing in light of considerations of comity and federalism. The Alabama Board
of Optometry began license revocation procedures against a group of non-independent
optometrists on the theory that state law only allowed licensing of independents. Since
the Board was made up exclusively of independent practitioners and since the independents stood to benefit economically from the elimination of the non-independents
from the competitive market, the non-independents brought a section 1983 action
in the federal court. They sought to enjoin the license revocation procedure on the
theory that the tribunal was biased and consequently it was a denial of due process
to be forced to defend themselves before the Board. The Court noted the general rule
that exhaustion is required before a federal court will hear a case; however, it found
this case to be within McNeese, which held that exhaustion of state administrative
remedies was not required where the case was brought under section 1983. Having
thus recognized the duty of the federal courts to enforce individual constitutional
rights against the state, the Court then considered the applicability of the Younger
doctrine. In effect, the Court was balancing its duty to the individual, as represented
by Monroe and McNeese, against its duty to respect the interests of the state as represented by Younger. (The Gibson Court held that the allegation of bias made abstention initially inappropriate since Younger assumed a competent, unbiased state tribunal
to which the federal court must defer. The Court thus found it necessary to determine
whether the Board was biased. Because such a determination amounted to a determination on the merits of the section 1983 claim, abstention was inappropriate altogether.)
91. See Comment, Federal Equitable Restraint: A Younger Analysis in New
Settings, 45 MD. L. REV. 483, 485 (1975).
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manner in which thousands of state prisoner complaints will be resolved
in the future. In addition, should the Court require exhaustion of the
remedy provided by the Maryland Inmate Grievance Commission, it is
likely that other states would adopt similar procedures for their own prisons.
Whatever the decision, it would seem preferable for the Supreme Court
actually to weigh the particular interests involved, rather than to restrict
itself to an analysis of past cases in the manner chosen by the Fourth Circuit.
Policy Considerations
The traditional justification for the non-exhaustion rule has been that
the best means of insuring immediate protection of federal rights is by
circumventing all state remedies in favor of immediate federal adjudication. 92 This notion is founded on the assumption that state courts and
agencies are unable and unwilling to protect federal rights. 93 In truth,
this traditional justification is only warranted where state administrative
or judicial remedies have not in fact been able to protect federal rightsY'
Where the state has made a good faith effort to provide prompt and effective relief for prisoners alleging deprivations of federal rights, and where
the state has in fact provided immediate protection of federal rights, the
policy considerations supporting a non-exhaustion rule become less than
compelling. Even if an exhaustion requirement were to be imposed on
state prisoners where administrative remedies were adequate, state prisoners
would not be deprived of a federal forum; their access to the federal courts
would only be postponed.
An important consideration in favor of imposing an exhaustion requirement with respect to state prisoner petitions is the current burden on
the federal courts. 95 When the federal courts serve as the initial forum
for these disputes, an enormous amount of time is necessary for the disposition of the claims. As the district court in McCray suggested, due
to the extended evidentiary hearings required in prisoners' rights cases,
one prisoner may occupy a substantial percentage of a judge's time. 96
A second consideration is the greater efficiency that results if an
administrative agency initially handles these complaints.97 Due to its
92. See Chevigny, Section 1983 Jurisdiction: A Reply, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1352,
1356-61 (1970).
93. Monroe v.Pape, 365 U.S.at 172-83.
94. Such would be the case where, for example, there has been a history of invidious racial discrimination by means of institutionalized racism.
95. See note 1 supra. For a summary of considerations in favor of exhaustion
see Comment, Exhaustion of State Remedies Under the Civil Rights Act, 68 COLUM.
L. REv. 1201, 1206-09 (1968).

96. 367 F. Supp. at 1195. For example, plaintiff McCray filed thirty-seven civil
rights suits in the district court from 1970 to 1973. Id. at 1217-18.
97. See McKart v. U.S., 395 U.S. 185, 193-94 (1969).
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general familiarity with prisoners and prison procedures, the agency is
able to resolve many grievances informally without the need for extensive
proceedings. 98 If substantial proceedings are necessary, the agency provides a permanent record which will be helpful should the prisoner decide
to pursue his complaint in the courts. At first blush, such a record may
appear prejudicial to the inmate if used by the federal court. Two considerations, however, act to dispel this tinge of prejudice. First, federal
courts apparently are not bound by the findings of state agencies;99
second, many of these pro se petitions are handwritten 00 by semi-literate
prisoners, so that the existence of a legible record is more likely to operate
in favor of the prisoner. Prisoners' claims may well receive more knowledgeable consideration in agency proceedings because state administrators
possess greater expertise in the area of prison administration than do
federal courts. In-house administrative hearings avoid the expense and
security risk of transporting prisoners to the federal courthouse. Finally,
orders issued by state agencies will probably be more easily enforceable
than federal injunctions because the agency works in close proximity with
prison administrators and is in a better position to monitor the execution
of its orders.
A third consideration is the state's interest in managing its own
prisons. Notions of federal-state comity, so important in many areas of
federal jurisdiction, 1' 1 are in no way served by the non-exhaustion rule.
Although the federal courts are justified in placing the constitutional rights
of state prisoners above the interests of the state when the two cannot be
adequately reconciled, they are not justified in ignoring the state's interest
when deference to the state can be accomplished without sacrificing individual constitutional rights. Given the finding of the district court in
McCray that the Maryland Inmate Grievance Commission is an adequate
state remedy, the idea of federalism requires an attempt to reconcile the
interest of the state in having this remedy used by its prisoners with the
interests of the inmates themselves. An obvious means of accomplishing
this reconciliation is to require state prisoners to exhaust state administrative remedies if the remedies adequately protect individual constitutional
rights. With such powerful considerations of policy recommending exhaustion, it seems only a matter of time before such a requirement is imposed.
98. See text accompanying notes 30-49 supra.
99. See Comment, Exhaustion of State Administrative Remedies In Section 1983
Cases, 41 U. CmI. L. REv. 537, 551 (1974).
100. Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's
Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, LAW & Soc. Q. 557,
566 (1973).
101. Three-judge courts, for example, as required under 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970),
give effect to notions of comity by providing a more august tribunal and a direct
appeal to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970) whenever a plaintiff
seeks to enjoin a state officer from enforcing a state statute on the grounds that the
statute is unconstitutional.
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ADEQUACY

A definition
Essential to a rule requiring exhaustion of adequate state remedies
is a definition of "adequacy." The Supreme Court, in Gibson, listed several
factors which have been relied upon by federal courts in judging state
administrative remedies to be inadequate. 0 2 The Court suggested that
administrative remedies were inadequate where the agency was responsible
for unreasonable delay, 0 3 where it was doubtful that the agency possessed
the power to grant effective relief,10 4 or where the administrative body was
biased and thus had prejudged the issue before it. 10 5 Each of the examples
listed by the Court arose in a context different in a basic way from the
context here relevant. Outside the purview of section 1983 there is a
general rule that exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite
to federal relief. 10 6 The examples enumerated by the Court in Gibson were
cases in which some fault of the agency was raised as an excuse for not
following the general rule. In section 1983 cases, however, the rule is
that exhaustion is unnecessary. 10 7 This Comment has suggested that an
exception should be recognized in the case of state prisoners where an
administrative remedy is shown to be adequate. 0 8 Such an affirmative
showing of adequacy requires the formulation of an exhaustive test for
a predetermination of adequacy rather than an enumeration of past insufficiencies. Such a test is necessary if the federal courts are to delegate
to the states the important duty of protecting individual rights against
unconstitutional state action.' 0 9

Because the district court in McCray held that exhaustion was required
where the administrative remedy was found adequate,11 it was faced with
the necessity of formulating such a test.
[T]he test for determining the adequacy of the available administrative state remedy is three-fold. First, the court must analyze the
theoretical due process adequacy of the state remedy, particularly
from the standpoint of making sure the remedy does not contain the
forbidden indicia of prejudgment which renders exhaustion inappropriate. Second, the court must look at the remedy in practice, to see
that it is being administered in an even handed and fair manner.
Finally, the third relevant consideration is one that all federal courts
must bear in mind when they are called upon to interject themselves
102. 411 U.S. at 575 n.14.
103. Id., citing Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587 (1926).
104. Id., citing Union Pac. R.R. v. Board of Comm'rs, 247 U.S. 282 (1918).
105. Id., citing Kelly v. Board of Educ., 159 F. Supp. 272 (M.D. Tenn. 1958).
106. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938).
107. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See text accompanying notes 65-74
supra.
108. See text accompanying notes 77-101 supra.
109. Morgan v. La Vallee, No. 75-2044 (2d Cir., Oct. 14, 1975) (dictum).
110. 367 F. Supp. at 1201.
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into matters entrusted by our form of Government to the realm of
the States, and that is, of course, the extent of the State's interest in
the subject matter of the federal litigation."'
There are several problems with this approach to adequacy. For
example, the reference to due process implies that the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment applies to the Commission's procedures. This
appears erroneous because the amendment requires due process only when
the state deprives someone of "life, liberty, or property.""n2 Unlike criminal
trials and other state actions which have been held subject to due process
requirements, the Commission cannot deprive prisoners of anything, but
instead seeks to redress deprivations. Therefore, analysis of the Commission's proceedings in terms of procedural due process would tend to confuse rather than elucidate the question of adequacy." 3 It is possible that
the court used "due process" not in its constitutional sense, but as a general
expression meaning fairness of procedure. Such a requirement of fairness would of course have a place in an adequacy test as a measure of the
extent to which the federal court must sacrifice its duty to vindicate individual rights to its duty to respect state interests; use of "due process"
to describe this requirement, however, creates the danger that criminal
trial due process requirements might be imported into grievance proceedings where they may not be desirable.
There is another problem with the court's analysis: the third consideration, the extent of the state's interest in the subject matter of the litigation, appears to be irrelevant in determining adequacy. Where personal
rights are involved, adequacy should depend upon the extent of the protection these rights are afforded regardless of the extent of the state's
interest in the subject matter of the proceeding. The state's interest is
relevant only after adequacy has been determined and the question is
whether exhaustion should be required.
It is surprising that the district court omitted from its formulation
the tautologous requirement that to be adequate the Commission must
have the power to grant effective relief. The omission appears to have
been intentional as the district court held that exhaustion would be required even where damages were sought despite the fact that the Commission has no power to grant damages." 4 While the district court attempted
111. Id.
112. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-79 (1972) ; Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593, 599-603 (1972); see Bradford v. Weinstein, 519 F.2d 728 (4th Cir.
1974), cert. granted, 421 U.S. 998 (1975).
113. It is true that the prisoner is deprived of his right to a federal forum for
the initial adjudication of his constitutional complaints if he is required to exhaust the
state remedy, and that this right may be a protected "liberty" under the Constitution;
however, the deprivation of this right would be accomplished, not by the state, but by
the federal court. The federal proceeding requiring exhaustion could therefore be
subject to procedural due process analysis under the fifth amendment; the state proceeding does not act to deprive the inmate of anything, much less "life, liberty, or
property," and therefore would not be subject to due process analysis.
114. 367 F. Supp. at 1208, 1210.
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to justify this on the theory that the claim would be but temporarily delayed from federal adjudication, it would seem that the district court's
conclusion is unjustifiable. As stated previously, the Supreme Court has
held that exhaustion is not required where the remedy is inadequate;1l5
therefore, inability to grant money damages should have been considered
dispositive of the question of adequacy as to McCray's damage claim.
The factors listed by the Court in Gibson suggest some additional
criteria to be included in an adequacy test. If an agency were responsible
for unreasonable delays in resolving issues brought to it, a federal court
should find the agency remedy inadequate." 6 Relief postponed may be
no relief at all. If, for example, an inmate were paroled or transferred
during the pendency of his complaint, his action might be dismissed as
moot or he might no longer wish to pursue his grievance. Furthermore, if
the prisoner were suffering continuing constitutional deprivations at the
hands of his jailers, his need for relief would be immediate. The fourteenth amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1871"1 impose a duty upon
the federal courts to respond to this need.' 18 Therefore, in order for the
administrative remedy to be good enough to justify the federal courts in
deferring to it, the agency must be able to respond promptly. Otherwise,
the federal court in requiring exhaustion would be derelict in its duty to
the individual.
What is sufficient dispatch, however, seems impossible of precise
definition. One practical means of judging promptness would be to compare the time taken by the agency with the time normally consumed by
a federal court in dealing with a similar issue. If the federal court were
to require the state agency to handle grievances as promptly as it itself
would but for the exhaustion requirement, it would at least be insuring
that a prisoner would not be delayed in any way by requiring exhaustion.
This assumes, of course, that the agency is in all other respects an adequate remedy.
The district court in McCray suggested that the remedy should be
administered in an "even-handed and fair manner."" 9 This coincides
with the suggestion in Gibson that a remedy would be inadequate if the
administrative body were biased. 12 0 What constitutes bias on the part of
an administrative body for the purpose of determining adequacy is again
a difficult problem. The Supreme Court recently held in Withrow v.
Larkin'2' that the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions
in a single administrative body was not by itself a sufficent showing of
bias to justify federal judicial interference with a state license revocation
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See text accompanying notes 102-05 supra.
Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587 (1926).
See note 3 supra.
Cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
367 F. Supp. at 1201.
411 U.S. at 577.
421 U.S. 35 (1975).
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proceeding. This reaffirms that due process does not require the highest
level of impartiality in an administrative board, but that some indicia of
partiality are constitutionally permissible in an administrative decision
maker. 1 22 It does not necessarily follow, however, that the federal courts
would or should find the same level of impartiality acceptable in the Commission for the purpose of deciding whether to require exhaustion. As
with every other criterion in this discussion of adequacy, the purpose of
an analysis of impartiality is to determine the extent to which the federal
court must sacrifice its duty to protect the individual when it defers to the
state remedy. The more partial the board, the greater would be the sacrifice
should the federal court require exhaustion, and, as a consequence, the
less likely will it be that such a requirement would be imposed. Given the
broad language in Monroe and the steadfast application of this language
to the differing cases which have arisen in which exhaustion could have
been, but was not, required,' 23 it seems likely that the federal courts will
not now decide to sacrifice their duty to the individual to any great extent.124 In other words, a greater level of impartiality may be required of
the Commission than due process was held to require in the license revocation proceeding in Withrow.
This issue is complicated by the difficulty in measuring bias. Although
a particular finding of unreasonable bias would probably suffice to justify
a general finding of inadequacy, it is not enough to say that in a particular
case or cases, the agency was impartial. One possible approach would be
for the court first to determine that unreasonable instances of actual bias
had not been shown, and then to study the make-up of the board to determine whether, by background, racial constitution, or job allegiance, it
appears likely that the board will in fact be impartial.
Another factor which should be considered by the federal courts
before requiring exhaustion is whether the agency proceedings produce a
permanent record, complete with findings of fact and conclusions of law. 125
Such a record should be required so that federal courts might have some
means of reviewing the adequacy of the state remedy as an occasional state
prisoner, disappointed by the conclusion of the agency, seeks federal relief
after exhaustion. In the analogous area of federal habeas corpus law where
state prisoners are required to exhaust state remedies unless there is a lack
of state process or there are circumstances rendering such process ineffective,126 the existence of a record is one factor to be considered in
deciding whether to impose an exhaustion requirement ;127 the rationale
122. See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941); Note, Prejudice
and the Administrative Process, 59 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 216, 227-28 (1964).
123. See notes 65-81 and accompanying text supra.
124. See Morgan v. La Vallee, No. 75-2044 (2d Cir., Oct. 14, 1975).
125. Cf. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (federal court required to hold
evidentiary hearing in habeas corpus actions where state proceeding record was
inadequate).
126. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1970).
127. See, e.g., Case v.Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336 (1965) (Brennan,J., concurring).
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for such a prerequisite, to facilitate federal review of the state procedure,,2"
appears to be equally applicable in the context of section 1983 and the
proposed exhaustion requirement.
Drawing on all the above factors, those enumerated in Gibson, those
derived from the analogous law of federal habeas corpus, and those contained in the test formulated by the district court in McCray, it is now
possible to formulate a new test: to be adequate, a state administrative

remedy should be prompt, it should be unbiased, it should be conducive to
fairness in its procedures, it should produce a permanent record, and it
should be able to grant effective relief.
The Commission: adequate or not?
It is now appropriate to apply this test to the Commission, the first
consideration being the element of delay. The district court concluded
that the Commission provided a swift alternative to federal equitable
relief.' 29 The Director has sixty days after receipt of the complaint in
which to make a preliminary review.' 3 0 If he finds merit to the complaint,
the Commission must schedule a hearing as soon as practicable.' 81 The
Commission is required to render a prompt decision. 132 If it finds the
complaint meritorious, the Secretary has fifteen days after receipt of the
commission's order in which to review.' 33 This time sequence indicates
that it should take the Commission from two to three months to dispose of a
complaint. Although statistics prepared for the McCray appeal indicated
that the actual median time between complaint and final order was approximately five to six months, 3 4 more recent statistics show that it presently
takes an average of three months. 135 In addition, the Director is able to
128. Id.
129. 367 F. Supp. at 1209.
130. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 204F(e) (Supp. 1975).
131. Id. at § 204F(f).
132. Id.
133. Id. at § 204F(f) (2).
134. See Exhibit D, Brief for Appellants at 88-89, McCray v. Burrell, 516 F2d
357 (4th Cir. 1975).
135. The Inmate Grievance Commission has compiled a statistical survey of
average disposition times for grievances during the one year period from October 17,
1974 to October 17, 1975. This information indicates:
AVERAGE TIME LAPSES

Grievances
Involved

Stages of
Proceedings Included

Number of
Days

All grievances (including
administrative dispositions)

Filing to disposition

40.6

Administrative dispositions

Filing to disposition

12

Filing to hearing
Hearing to disposition

47.7
47.2

Hearing to disposition

50

Grievances not disposed
of administratively
Meritorious grievances
Non-meritorious
grievances
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resolve informally most complaints, many of which are found to be meritorious, in a fraction of this time.13 6 It can therefore be concluded that
relief is in general very prompt and that the Commission compares favorably with the federal courts in this respect. 137 Although it is not expressly
authorized to do so, the Commission has on rare occasion granted interim
relief. 138 This power enhances the desirability of having grievances submitted initially to the Commission since even a federal temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction is unlikely to be granted any
more promptly.
The second consideration is whether the agency is biased. Of the
1,065 orders issued through August 1975, three hundred held that the
prisoner's grievance was meritorious. 139 Because this percentage is probably higher than the percentage of meritorious section 1983 actions brought
in the federal courts by state prisoners, 140 it amounts to at least a statistical indication of impartiality. In addition, the Commission is autonomous
in that its members are appointed and removed by the Governor ;141 no
one within the Division of Corrections or the Department of Public Safety
and Correctional Services has direct control over the membership of the
Commission. Despite the finding of the district court in McCray that the
Commission was a fair and impartial tribunal, 142 there is some room for
criticism. For example, the Commission is part of the same department
as the Division of Correction so that the Secretary is both responsible
for the operation of the prisons and for reviewing and enforcing the orders
of the Commission. While this gives the orders of the Commission, when
affirmed by the Secretary, an authority they might not otherwise enjoy,
situations could arise in which the Secretary would have a conflict of
interests. To the extent the Secretary formulates policy, for example,
any grievance arising as a result of the Secretary's policy would not be
likely to receive impartial scrutiny by the Secretary himself. Institutional
bias of this sort has its place in administrative adjudicatory functions in
many contexts for a variety of reasons. 143 The focus here, however, is not
on determining the best way for the Department of Public Safety and
Correctional Services to operate, but on the extent to which the federal
court must sacrifice its duty to protect individual rights to its duty to
136. See notes 30-33 and accompanying text supra.
137. The median time interval from filing to disposition of civil rights prisoner
petitions during 1975 for all federal district courts was three months. For those
going to trial, the median time was eleven months. 1974 DiR. ADM. OFF. U.S. CTS.,
ANN. REP. 432-33.
138. E.g., In re Joseph Wallace, I.G.C. No. 1521 (Dec. 4, 1972), summarized by
the district court in McCray, 367 F. Supp. at 1208.
139. MD. INMATE GRIEVANCE COMM'N, STATISTICAL SUMMARY (Aug. 1975).
140. See McCray, 367 F. Supp. at 1206.
141. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
142. See McCray, 367 F. Supp. at 1202.
143. See Comment, ProceduralDue Process and the Separation of Functions in
State Occupational Licensing Agencies, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 833.
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defer to the Commission as an important state function. Thus, while the
Department may well operate more efficiently if the Secretary himself
reviews and signs the Commission's orders, the federal court may hesitate
to require exhaustion of this remedy due to a possibility of institutional
bias against the inmates.
A related problem arises from the fact that the statute requires that
two of the members on the Commission have expertise in fields within
the realm of correctional services. 44 Because there is no concomitant
requirement for a representative of the prisoner's interests, e.g., an attorney who has specialized in representing prisoners or other civil rights litigants, the statute tends to promote bias by occupational background. How
important this tendency will be in the Court's assessment of adequacy
remains to be seen. In any event, the Maryland General Assembly could
eliminate this problem either by repealing the provision which requires
two members to have correctional service expertise, or by offsetting
this provision with a requirement for members with a background in
prisoner representation.
The third consideration is the fairness of the Commission procedures.
The district court concluded that the procedures were fair, 145 and with
good reason. The inmate is afforded a hearing unless his grievance is
disposed of administratively. At this hearing he may be represented by
a lawyer, he has the opportunity to call a reasonable number of witnesses,
and he has the right to question adverse witnesses. The hearing is conducted informally with everyone seated around a table. The inmate
presents his case, the institution responds, and there is questioning of
the parties and the witnesses until all the evidence is obtained. No formal
rules of evidence impede this process, although the Commission does
attempt to gather the best evidence available. The Commission may
make further necessary investigations on its own. Finally, the inmate
receives notice of the decision.' 46 Inmates are somewhat limited in powers
of discovery, however, because their right to call a reasonable number of
witnesses and to subpoena documents is subject to the Commission's discretionary determination as to the relevancy of the witnesses' testimony
and the usefulness of the documents to a decision on the merits of the
claim. 147 In this respect the federal courts provide procedures more favorable to the inmate. In addition, three of the commissioners are nonlawyers ;148 thus, there may be some basis for faulting the fairness of the
procedure for not providing a tribunal with greater legal expertise. 49
144. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 204F(a) (Supp. 1975).
145. 367 F. Supp. at 1202, 1204-05.
146. The hearing procedures are described in greater detail at notes 29-42 and
accompanying text supra.
147. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 204F(g) (h) (Supp. 1975) ; Washington v. Boslow,
375 F. Supp. 1298, 1301 (D. Md. 1974).
148. See McCray, 367 F. Supp. at 1202.
149. For example, In re Smithson, I.G.C. No. 3455 (Sept. 25, 1975), concerned
an inmate of Patuxent Institution who complained that his brother, a former inmate
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This potential fault is somewhat ameliorated by the fact that two of the
commissioners as well as the Director are attorneys and the staff of the
Commission includes a legal assistant who attends hearings and assists
in the preparation of orders. Still, the statute requires that only two of
the members be attorneys; to ensure a higher level of expertise at every
hearing, perhaps the statute should be amended to require that three or
more of the members be attorneys. Alternatively, the statute could require
specific legal training for all members in the areas of law with which the
Commission generally deals. Despite these possible faults, however, it
seems fair to conclude that in general the Commission's procedures are,
in fact, a fair method of resolving disputes concerning the conditions
of confinement.
The fourth factor is whether the Commission provides an adequate
record. Each hearing results in an order that consists of a summary of
the nature of the complaint, along with the dates of filings and of the
hearing; a summary of the testimony of the complainant, his witnesses
and his attorneys, if any; the responses of the institutional representatives,
their witnesses and attorneys, if any; findings of fact; conclusions on the
merits of the claim; and the final disposition of the case. 150 Any modifications made by the Secretary, along with explanations, are appended to
the order and made a part of the permanent record. In addition, the hearing itself is tape recorded ;151 in the event of judicial review, this tape is
transcribed into typewritten form, thus providing a complete record.' 2 In
this respect, the Commission's procedures appear to be completely adequate.
The final consideration is the Commission's ability to grant effective
relief. The district court concluded that the Commission offers "an effective . . .alternative to the exercise of federal equity power."' 53 As noted

earlier, the Commission's power consists only of its authorization to issue
at Patuxent, had been wrongfully excluded from the inmate's list of visitors while
other inmates' relatives who were also former inmates were not so excluded. The
institution claimed that to allow visitors who were wise to prison ways would
amount to a substantial security risk; the Commission held that this was a reasonable
security precaution. Although the facts appear to present the issue, the Commission
did not consider whether this was a denial of equal protection. It is possible that
many analogous factual situations arise which, when combined with some legal theory,
present issues of constitutional law. Only if the tribunal is familiar with the legal
theory can the inmate receive an adequate adjudication. Cf. Gordon v. Justice Court,
12 Cal. 3d 323, 115 Cal. Rptr. 632, 525 P.2d 72 (1974) (due process requires that
where a criminal trial may result in incarceration the judge must be an attorney).
150. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 204F(i), (k) (Supp. 1975) ; 12 Md. Agency
Rules & Reg., Inmate Grievance Comm'n, R. 12.07.05.01 (1971). These require that
records be kept and that the order contain conclusions and findings of fact. The orders
themselves, however, which are compiled and kept at the offices of the Commission,
reflect a policy of greater detail in their scope.
151. See McCray, 367 F. Supp. at 1203.
152. Interview with Mr. Robert H. Wolfe, Legal Assistant of the Maryland
Inmate Grievance Commission, in Baltimore, Sept. 26, 1975.
153. 367 F. Supp. at 1209.
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"orders" which may be affirmed or denied by the Secretary; only the
Secretary can order the officers and institutions of the correctional system
to stop practices offensive to constitutionally protected rights.154 However, the Secretary's power of review is limited, by opinion of the Attorney
General, to that of a court reviewing an administrative proceeding. 155 The
Commission has also issued interim orders granting temporary relief until
such time as a hearing could be scheduled, 158 but it is not expressly
authorized by statute to do this and has infrequently used this procedure.
Additionally, unlike the federal courts, the Commission has no express
power to grant class relief even though nothing in the statute forbids it.
Finally, the Commission has no contempt power, but, unlike the courts,
it can, through the Secretary, discipline or fire persons who abuse prisoners.
From this, it is apparent that, through the Secretary, the Commission is
able to grant effective injunctive relief.
The district court also concluded that while the Commission has no
power to award damages, a prisoner must still present his grievance to the
Commission whether he seeks injunctive or monetary relief.' 57 Until recently the Commission would often order reimbursement to the inmate
in what it called "property cases," i.e., cases in which the negligence of an
institutional employee caused property loss and damage to the inmate. 1 58
The Attorney General recently advised that neither the Commission nor
the Secretary were empowered to grant such relief and that, in any event,
the state enjoyed sovereign immunity from such claims. 159 This particular point is being litigated in several courts ;160 pending decision, the
Commission is holding in abeyance all property complaints filed. 161 Moreover, the Commission has never awarded damages for personal injury,
pain and suffering, emotional distress, or other damage theories not included in the notion of "property cases." The conclusion therefore seems
inescapable that the Commission is unable to grant effective relief where
154. See text accompanying notes 43-44 supra.
155. 59 MD. ATT'y GEN. REP. & Op. 444-56 (1974). The Secretary should:
(1) Accept the findings of fact as conclusive provided such findings contain
a concise statement of conclusions upon each contested issue of fact; (2) determine
whether the facts, as found by the Commission, support a determination that the
inmate has been deprived of his constitutional and/or legal rights or that administrative relief is required; and (3) determine whether the Commission's order
is appropriate.
Id.
156. 367 F. Supp. at 1208. See note 134 and accompanying text supra.
157. 367 F. Supp. at 1210.
158. E.g., In re Tull, I.G.C. No. 2877 (Jan. 30, 1975); In re Taylor, I.G.C. No.
2934 (Jan. 30, 1975). Both of these cases were reversed on the advice of the Attorney
General of Maryland.
159. 60 MD. ATT'y GEN. REP. & Op. 285 (1975).
160. E.g., In re Taylor, A 7386 (Howard County Cir. Ct.) (July 8, 1975) ; In re
Tull, 097185, p. 137, Docket No. 23P (Baltimore City Ct., July 9, 1975).
161. Interview with Mr. Robert H. Wolfe, Legal Assistant of the Maryland
Inmate Grievance Commission, in Baltimore, Sept. 26, 1975.
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damages are sought and it is difficult to see how the prisoner can be
denied his day in federal court in this situation. To require exhaustion
here would be to require a futile act. Moreover, there is no easy resolution to the problem, for to amend the statute to empower the Commission to award compensatory and punitive damages against prison guards
could present serious constitutional problems including questions of sepa162
ration of powers and due process.
In summary, the Commission may need improvement in three areas
before it will be deemed an adequate grievance procedure by the federal
courts. The most important and most fundamental change that should be
considered is the further restriction of the power of the Secretary over the
Commission in order to eliminate the suggestion of institutional bias
against the inmate. Perhaps his role should be limited to a simple choice
between enforcing the Commission's orders or seeking judicial review.
In addition, the statute should be amended to give the Commission express
authority to issue interim orders and to grant class relief. Finally, the
General Assembly should explore the possibility of extending power to
the Commission to award compensation for torts committed by prison
officials against inmates.
CONCLUSION

The Maryland Inmate Grievance Commission was created to provide
a prompt, efficient, and informal procedure for resolving inmate grievances
without the need for formal litigation. The federal doctrine of non-exhaustion of state remedies in section 1983 cases, however, allows state prisoners
to choose between the Commission and the federal courts. Strong considerations of comity and efficiency suggest that the rule should be changed
to require exhaustion in the case of state prisoners where states provide
adequate administrative remedies. What is adequate for this purpose is a
difficult question, but five factors - promptness, lack of bias, procedures
conducive to fairness, creation of a permanent record, and ability to grant
effective relief - provide some basis for evaluating the Commission. Such
an evaluation reveals that although the Commission is in fact a reasonable
substitute for federal relief in most cases, there is room for improvement
in certain respects, especially with regard to its autonomy and its impartiality. The General Assembly should institute these changes for the
benefit of Maryland's prisons and inmates alike; the federal courts or
Congress should recognize and encourage these efforts by requiring state
prisoners to exhaust this remedy, once made truly adequate, before entering federal court.
162. See County Council v. Investors Funding Corp., 270 Md. 403, 312 A.2d 225
(1973); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 109-15 (1965);

Tomlinson, Constitutional Limits on the Decisional Powers of Courts and Administrative Agencies in Maryland, 35 MD. L. REv. 414 (1975).

